

Lecture 08:


Static Program Analysis

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Where are we?

- ▶ 01: Concepts of Quality
- ▶ 02: Legal Requirements: Norms and Standards
- ▶ 03: The Software Development Process
- ▶ 04: Hazard Analysis
- ▶ 05: High-Level Design with SysML
- ▶ 06: Formal Modelling with OCL
- ▶ 07: Testing
- ▶ 08: Static Program Analysis
- ▶ 09-10: Software Verification
- ▶ 11-12: Model Checking
- ▶ 13: Conclusions

Program Analysis in the Development Cycle



Static Program Analysis

- ▶ Analysis of run-time behaviour of programs **without executing them** (sometimes called static testing).
- ▶ Analysis is done for **all** possible runs of a program (i.e. considering all possible inputs).
- ▶ Typical questions answered:
 - ▶ Does the variable x have a constant value ?
 - ▶ Is the value of the variable x always positive ?
 - ▶ Are all pointer dereferences valid (or NULL)?
 - ▶ Are all arithmetic operations well-defined?
- ▶ These tasks can be used for **verification** or for **optimization** when compiling.

Usage of Program Analysis

Optimizing compilers

- ▶ Detection of sub-expressions that are evaluated multiple times
- ▶ Detection of unused local variables
- ▶ Pipeline optimizations

Program verification

Search for runtime errors in programs (program safety):

- ▶ Null pointer or other illegal pointer dereferences
- ▶ Array access out of bounds
- ▶ Exceptions which are thrown and not caught
- ▶ Division by zero
- ▶ Over/underflow of integers, rounding errors with floating point numbers
- ▶ Runtime estimation (worst-case executing time, wcet)

In other words, **specific** verification **aspects**.

Program Analysis: The Basic Problem

Given a property P and a program p : $p \models P$ iff P holds for p

- ▶ Wanted: a terminating algorithm $\phi(p, P)$ which computes $p \models P$
 - ▶ ϕ is sound if $\phi(p, P)$ implies $p \models P$
 - ▶ ϕ is complete if $\neg\phi(p, P)$ implies $\neg p \models P$
 - ▶ If ϕ is sound and complete then ϕ is a decision procedure

The **basic problem** of static program analysis: virtually all interesting program properties are **undecidable!** (cf. Gödel, Turing)

- ▶ From the basic problem it follows that there are no sound and complete tools for interesting properties.

- ▶ Tools for interesting properties are either
 - ▶ sound (under-approximating) or
 - ▶ complete (over-approximating).


Program Analysis: Approximation

- ▶ **Under-approximation** is sound but not complete. It only finds correct programs but may miss out some.

- ▶ Useful in **optimizing compilers**;
- ▶ Optimization must preserve semantics of program, but is optional.

- ▶ **Over-approximation** is complete but not sound. It finds all errors but may find non-errors (false positives).

- ▶ Useful in verification;
- ▶ Safety analysis must find all errors, but may report some more.
- ▶ Too high rate of false positives may hinder acceptance of tool.



Program Analysis Approach

- ▶ Provides **approximate** answers

- ▶ yes / no / don't know or
- ▶ superset or subset of values

- ▶ Uses an **abstraction** of program's behavior

- ▶ Abstract data values (e.g. sign abstraction)
- ▶ Summarization of information from execution paths e.g. branches of the if-else statement

- ▶ **Worst-case** assumptions about environment's behavior

- ▶ e.g. any value of a method parameter is possible.

- ▶ Sufficient **precision** with good **performance**.

Analysis Properties: Flow Sensitivity

Flow-insensitive analysis

- Program is seen as an unordered collection of statements
- Results are valid for any order of statements
e.g. $S_1 ; S_2$ vs. $S_2 ; S_1$
- Example: type analysis (inference)

Flow-sensitive analysis

- Considers program's flow of control
- Uses control-flow graph as a representation of the source
- Example: available expressions analysis

Intra- vs. Inter-procedural Analysis

Intra-procedural analysis

- Single function is analyzed in isolation.
- Maximally pessimistic assumptions about parameter values and results of procedure calls.

Inter-procedural analysis

- Procedure calls are considered.
- Whole program is analyzed at once.

A Simple Programming Language

Arithmetic expressions:

$$a ::= x \mid n \mid a_1 op_a a_2$$

- Arithmetic operators: $op_a \in \{+, -, *, /\}$

Boolean expressions:

$$b ::= \text{true} \mid \text{false} \mid \text{not } b \mid b_1 op_b b_2 \mid a_1 op_r a_2$$

- Boolean operators: $op_b \in \{\text{and}, \text{or}\}$

- Relational operators: $op_r \in \{=, <, \leq, >, \geq, \neq\}$

Statements:

$$S ::= [x := a]^l \mid [\text{skip}]^l \mid S_1; S_2 \mid \text{if } [b]^l \text{ } S_1 \text{ else } S_2 \mid \text{while } [b]^l \text{ } S$$

- Note this abstract syntax, operator precedence and grouping statements is not covered. We can use {} and {} to group statements, and (and) to group expressions.

Computing the Control Flow Graph

- The control flow $\text{flow}: S \rightarrow \mathbb{P}(\text{Lab} \times \text{Lab})$
and reverse control $\text{flow}^R: S \rightarrow \mathbb{P}(\text{Lab} \times \text{Lab})$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{flow}([x := a]^l) &= \emptyset \\ \text{flow}([\text{skip}]^l) &= \emptyset \\ \text{flow}(S_1; S_2) &= \text{flow}(S_1) \cup \text{flow}(S_2) \cup \{(l, \text{init}(S_2)) \mid l \in \text{final}(S_1)\} \\ \text{flow}(\text{if } [b]^l \text{ } S_1 \text{ else } S_2) &= \text{flow}(S_1) \cup \text{flow}(S_2) \cup \{(l, \text{init}(S_1)), (l, \text{init}(S_2))\} \\ \text{flow}(\text{while } [b]^l \text{ } S) &= \text{flow}(S) \cup \{(l, \text{init}(S))\} \cup \{(l', l) \mid l' \in \text{final}(S)\} \\ \text{flow}^R(S) &= \{(l', l) \mid (l, l') \in \text{flow}(S)\} \end{aligned}$$

- The **control flow graph** of a program S is given by
 - elementary blocks $\text{block}(S)$ as nodes, and
 - $\text{flow}(S)$ as vertices.

Additional useful definitions

$$\begin{aligned} \text{labels}(S) &= \{l \mid [B]^l \in \text{blocks}(S)\} \\ \text{FV}(a) &= \text{free variables in } a \\ \text{Aexp}(S) &= \text{non-trivial subexpressions in } S \text{ (variables and constants are trivial)} \end{aligned}$$

Analysis Properties: Context Sensitivity

Context-sensitive analysis

- Stack of procedure invocations and return values of method parameters
- Results of analysis of the method M depend on the caller of M

Context-insensitive analysis

- Produces the same results for all possible invocations of M independent of possible callers and parameter values.

Data-Flow Analysis

Focus on questions related to values of variables and their lifetime

Selected analyses:

- Available expressions (forward analysis)**
 - Which expressions have been computed already without change of the occurring variables (optimization)?
- Reaching definitions (forward analysis)**
 - Which assignments contribute to a state in a program point? (verification)
- Very busy expressions (backward analysis)**
 - Which expressions are executed in a block regardless which path the program takes (verification)?
- Live variables (backward analysis)**
 - Is the value of a variable in a program point used in a later part of the program (optimization)?

Computing the Control Flow Graph

- To calculate the CFG, we define some functions on the abstract syntax S :

$$\begin{aligned} \text{init}([x := a]^l) &= l \\ \text{init}([\text{skip}]^l) &= l \\ \text{init}(S_1; S_2) &= \text{init}(S_1) \\ \text{init}(\text{if } [b]^l \{ S_1 \} \text{ else } S_2) &= l \\ \text{init}(\text{while } [b]^l \{ S \}) &= l \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{final}([x := a]^l) &= \{l\} \\ \text{final}([\text{skip}]^l) &= \{l\} \\ \text{final}(S_1; S_2) &= \text{final}(S_2) \\ \text{final}(\text{if } [b]^l \{ S_1 \} \text{ else } S_2) &= \text{final}(S_1) \cup \text{final}(S_2) \\ \text{final}(\text{while } [b]^l \{ S \}) &= \{l\} \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{blocks}([x := a]^l) &= \{[x := a]^l\} \\ \text{blocks}([\text{skip}]^l) &= \{[\text{skip}]^l\} \\ \text{blocks}(S_1; S_2) &= \text{blocks}(S_1) \cup \text{blocks}(S_2) \\ \text{blocks}(\text{if } [b]^l \{ S_1 \} \text{ else } S_2) &= \{[b]^l\} \cup \text{blocks}(S_1) \cup \text{blocks}(S_2) \\ \text{blocks}(\text{while } [b]^l \{ S \}) &= \{[b]^l\} \cup \text{blocks}(S) \end{aligned}$$

An Example Program

$$P = [x := a+b]^1; [y := a*b]^2; \text{while } [y > a+b]^3 \{ [a := a+1]^4; [x := a+b]^5 \}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \text{init}(P) &= 1 \\ \text{final}(P) &= \{3\} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{blocks}(P) = \{ [x := a+b]^1, [y := a*b]^2, [y > a+b]^3, [a := a+1]^4, [x := a+b]^5 \}$$

$$\text{flow}(P) = \{(1, 2), (2, 3), (3, 4), (4, 5), (5, 3)\}$$


$$\text{flow}^R(P) = \{(2, 1), (3, 2), (4, 3), (5, 4), (3, 5)\}$$

$$\text{labels}(P) = \{1, 2, 3, 4, 5\}$$


$$\text{FV}(a+b) = \{a, b\}$$

$$\text{FV}(P) = \{a, b, x, y\}$$

$$\text{Aexp}(P) = \{a+b, a*b, a+1\}$$



Program Analysis CFG : General Idea



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


Available Expression Analysis

- The available expression analysis will determine for each program point:

which non-trivial expressions have been already computed in prior statements (and are still valid)

„Caching of expressions“



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Available Expression Analysis


$$\begin{aligned} \text{gen}(\{x := a\}^l) &= \{ \text{exp} \in \text{Aexp}(a) \mid x \notin \text{FV}(\text{exp}) \} \\ \text{gen}(\{\text{skip}\}^l) &= \emptyset \\ \text{gen}(\{b\}^l) &= \text{Aexp}(b) \\ \text{kill}(\{x := a\}^l) &= \{ \text{exp} \in \text{Aexp}(S) \mid x \in \text{FV}(\text{exp}) \} \\ \text{kill}(\{\text{skip}\}^l) &= \emptyset \\ \text{kill}(\{b\}^l) &= \emptyset \\ AE_{in}(l) &= \begin{cases} \emptyset, \text{ if } l \in \text{init}(S) \\ \cap \{AE_{out}(l') \mid (l', l) \in \text{flow}(S)\}, \text{ otherwise} \end{cases} \\ AE_{out}(l) &= (AE_{in}(l) \setminus \text{kill}(B^l)) \cup \text{gen}(B^l), \text{ where } B^l \in \text{blocks}(S) \end{aligned}$$

l	$\text{kill}(B)$	$\text{gen}(B)$
1	\emptyset	$\{a+b\}$
2	\emptyset	$\{a \cdot b\}$
3	\emptyset	$\{a+b\}$
4	$\{a+b, a \cdot b, a+1\}$	\emptyset
5	\emptyset	$\{a+b\}$

l	AE_{in}	AE_{out}
1	\emptyset	$\{a+b\}$
2	$\{a+b\}$	$\{a+b, a \cdot b\}$
3	$\{a+b\}$	$\{a+b\}$
4	$\{a+b\}$	\emptyset
5	\emptyset	$\{a+b\}$

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
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Reaching Definitions Analysis

- Reaching definitions (assignment) analysis determines if:

An assignment of the form $\{x := a\}^l$ reaches a program point k if **there is** an execution path where x was last assigned at l when the program reaches k



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Reaching Definitions Analysis


$$\begin{aligned} \text{gen}(\{x := a\}^l) &= \{(x, l)\} \quad \text{kill}(\{\text{skip}\}^l) = \emptyset \\ \text{gen}(\{\text{skip}\}^l) &= \emptyset \quad \text{kill}(\{b\}^l) = \emptyset \\ \text{gen}(\{b\}^l) &= \emptyset \quad \text{kill}(\{x := a\}^l) = \{(x, ?)\} \cup \{(x, k) \mid B^k \text{ is an assignment in } S\} \\ RD_{in}(l) &= \begin{cases} \{(x, ?) \mid x \in \text{FV}(S)\} \text{ if } l \in \text{init}(S) \\ \cup \{RD_{out}(l') \mid (l', l) \in \text{flow}(S)\} \text{ otherwise} \end{cases} \\ RD_{out}(l) &= (RD_{in}(l) \setminus \text{kill}(B^l)) \cup \text{gen}(B^l), \text{ where } B^l \in \text{blocks}(S) \end{aligned}$$

l	$\text{kill}(B)$	$\text{gen}(B)$
1	$\{(x, ?), (x, 1), (x, 5)\}$	$\{(x, 1)\}$
2	$\{(y, ?), (y, 2), (y, 4)\}$	$\{(y, 2)\}$
3	\emptyset	\emptyset
4	$\{(y, ?), (y, 2), (y, 4)\}$	$\{(y, 4)\}$
5	$\{(x, ?), (x, 1), (x, 5)\}$	$\{(x, 5)\}$

l	RD_{in}	RD_{out}
1	$\{(x, ?), (y, ?)\}$	$\{(x, 1), (y, ?)\}$
2	$\{(x, 1), (y, ?)\}$	$\{(x, 1), (y, 2)\}$
3	$\{(x, 1), (x, 5)\}$	$\{(x, 1), (x, 5), (y, 2), (y, 4)\}$
4	$\{(x, 1), (x, 5), (y, 2), (y, 4)\}$	$\{(x, 1), (x, 5), (y, 4)\}$
5	$\{(x, 1), (x, 5), (y, 4)\}$	$\{(x, 5), (y, 4)\}$

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


Live Variables Analysis

- A variable x is **live** at some program point (l) if there exists if there exists a path from l to an exit point that does not change the variable

- Live Variables Analysis determines:
 - for each program point, which variables *may* be still live at the exit from that point.

- Application: dead code elimination.



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Live Variables Analysis


$$\begin{aligned} \text{gen}(\{x := a\}^l) &= \text{FV}(a) & \text{kill}(\{x := a\}^l) &= \{x\} \\ \text{gen}(\{\text{skip}\}^l) &= \emptyset & \text{kill}(\{\text{skip}\}^l) &= \emptyset \\ \text{gen}(\{b\}^l) &= \text{FV}(b) & \text{kill}(\{b\}^l) &= \emptyset \\ LV_{out}(l) &= \begin{cases} \emptyset \text{ if } l \in \text{final}(S) \\ \cup \{LV_{in}(l') \mid (l', l) \in \text{flow}^R(S)\} \text{ otherwise} \end{cases} \\ LV_{in}(l) &= (LV_{out}(l) \setminus \text{kill}(B^l)) \cup \text{gen}(B^l), \text{ where } B^l \in \text{blocks}(S) \end{aligned}$$

l	$\text{kill}(B)$	$\text{gen}(B)$
1	$\{x\}$	\emptyset
2	$\{y\}$	\emptyset
3	$\{x\}$	\emptyset
4	\emptyset	$\{x, y\}$
5	$\{z\}$	$\{y\}$
6	$\{z\}$	$\{y\}$
7	$\{x\}$	$\{z\}$

l	LV_{in}	LV_{out}
1	\emptyset	\emptyset
2	\emptyset	$\{y\}$
3	$\{y\}$	$\{x, y\}$
4	$\{x, y\}$	$\{y\}$
5	$\{x, y\}$	$\{z\}$
6	$\{y\}$	$\{z\}$
7	$\{z\}$	\emptyset

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First Generalized Schema

- $\text{Analysis}_{\circ}(l) = \begin{cases} \text{EV} \text{ if } l \in E \\ \square \{\text{Analysis}_{\circ}(l') \mid (l', l) \in \text{Flow}(S)\} \text{ otherwise} \end{cases}$

- $\text{Analysis}_{\bullet}(l) = f_1(\text{Analysis}_{\circ}(l))$

With:

- EV is the initial / final analysis information

- E is either $\{\text{init}(S)\}$ or $\text{final}(S)$


- \square is either \cup or \cap

- Flow is either flow or flow^R

- f_1 is the transfer function associated with $B^l \in \text{blocks}(S)$



Forward analysis: $\text{Flow} = \text{flow}$, $\bullet = \text{OUT}$, $\circ = \text{IN}$

Backward analysis: $\text{Flow} = \text{flow}^R$, $\bullet = \text{IN}$, $\circ = \text{OUT}$



Partial Order

- $L = (M, \sqsubseteq)$ is a **partial order** iff
 - Reflexivity: $\forall x \in M. x \sqsubseteq x$
 - Transitivity: $\forall x, y, z \in M. x \sqsubseteq y \wedge y \sqsubseteq z \Rightarrow x \sqsubseteq z$
 - Anti-symmetry: $\forall x, y \in M. x \sqsubseteq y \wedge y \sqsubseteq x \Rightarrow x = y$
- Let $L = (M, \sqsubseteq)$ be a partial order, $S \subseteq M$
 - $y \in M$ is **upper bound** for S ($S \sqsubseteq y$) iff $\forall x \in S. x \sqsubseteq y$
 - $y \in M$ is **lower bound** for S ($y \sqsubseteq S$) iff $\forall x \in S. y \sqsubseteq x$
 - **Least upper bound** $\sqcup X \in M$ of $X \subseteq M$:
 - $X \sqsubseteq \sqcup X \wedge \forall y \in M. X \sqsubseteq y \Rightarrow \sqcup X \sqsubseteq y$
 - **Greatest lower bound** $\sqcap X$ of $X \subseteq M$:
 - $\sqcap X \sqsubseteq X \wedge \forall y \in M. y \sqsubseteq X \Rightarrow y \sqsubseteq \sqcap X$



Lattice

A **lattice** ("Verband") is a partial order $L = (M, \sqsubseteq)$ such that

- (1) $\sqcup X$ and $\sqcap X$ exist for all $X \subseteq L$
 - (2) Unique greatest element $T = \sqcup L$
 - (3) Unique least element $\perp = \sqcap L$
- (1) Alternatively (for finite M), binary operators \sqcup and \sqcap ("meet" and "join") such that
- $$x, y \sqsubseteq x \sqcup y \text{ and } x \sqcap y \sqsubseteq x, y$$

Transfer Functions

- Transfer functions to propagate information along the execution path (i.e. from input to output, or vice versa)
- Let $L = (M, \sqsubseteq)$ be a lattice. Let F be the set of transfer functions of the form
 $f_l: M \rightarrow M$ with l being a label
- Knowledge transfer is monotone
 - $\forall x, y. x \sqsubseteq y \Rightarrow f_l(x) \sqsubseteq f_l(y)$
- Space F of transfer functions
 - F contains all transfer functions f_l
 - F contains the identity function id $\forall x \in M. id(x) = x$
 - F is closed under composition $\forall f, g \in F. (g \circ f) \in F$

The Generalized Analysis

$$\text{Analysis}_*(l) = \sqcup \{\text{Analysis}_*(l') \mid (l', l) \in F\} \cup \{l'_E\}$$

$$\text{with } l'_E = \begin{cases} l & \text{if } l \in E \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Analysis}_*(l) = f_l(\text{Analysis}_*(l))$$

With:

- M property space representing data flow information with (M, \sqsubseteq) being a lattice
- A space F of transfer functions f_l and a mapping f from labels to transfer functions in F
- F is a finite flow (i.e. $flow$ or $flow^R$)
- l is an extremal value for the extremal labels E (i.e. $\{init(S)\}$ or $final(S)$)

Instances of Framework


	Available Expr.	Reaching Def.	Live Vars.
M	$\mathcal{P}(AExpr)$	$\mathcal{P}(Var \times L)$	$\mathcal{P}(Var)$
\sqsubseteq	\supseteq	\subseteq	\subseteq
\sqcup	\sqcap	\sqcup	\sqcup
\perp	$AExpr$	\emptyset	\emptyset
ι	\emptyset	$\{(x, ?) \mid x \in FV(S)\}$	\emptyset
E	$\{init(S)\}$	$\{init(S)\}$	$final(S)$
F	$flow(S)$	$flow(S)$	$flow^R(S)$
f_l	$\{f : M \rightarrow M \mid \exists m_k, m_g. f(m) = (m \setminus m_k) \cup m_g\}$	$f_l(m) = (m \setminus kill(B')) \cup gen(B')$ where $B' \in blocks(S)$	

Limitations of Data Flow Analysis

- The general framework of data flow analysis treats all outgoing edges **uniformly**. This can be a problem if conditions influence the property we want to analyse.
- Example: show no division by 0 can occur.
- Property space:
 - $M_0 = \{\perp, \{0\}, \{0,1\}\}$ (ordered by inclusion)
 - $M = Loc \rightarrow M_0$ (ordered pointwise)
 - $app_\sigma(t) \in M_0$ „approximate evaluation“ of t under $\sigma \in M$
 - $cond_\sigma(b) \in M$ strengthening of $\sigma \in M$ under condition b
 - $gen[x = a] = \sigma[x \mapsto app_\sigma(a)]$
 - Kill needs to distinguish whether cond'n holds:
 $kill[b]_\sigma^{if} = cond_\sigma(b)$ $kill[b]_\sigma^{then} = cond_\sigma(! b)$
- This leads us to **abstract interpretation**.

Program Analysis for Information Flow Control

Confidentiality as a property of dependencies:




- The GPS data 53:06:23 N 8:51:08 O is confidential.
- The information on the GPS data must not leave Bob's mobile phone
- First idea: 53:06:23 N 8:51:08 O does not appear (explicitly) on the output line.
 - too strong, too weak
- Instead: The output of Bob's smart phone does not **depend** on the GPS setting
 - Changing the location (e.g. to 53:06:29 N 8:51:04 O) will not change the observed output of Bob's smart phone

Note: Confidentiality is formalized as a notion of dependability.

Confidentiality as Dependability


Confidential action:

change location (from 53:06:23 N 8:51:08 O) to 53:06:29 N 8:51:04 O



Insecure system:
output 53:06:29 depends on GPS data


Secure System:
output 53:06:23 does not depend on GPS data



Program Slicing

- ▶ Which parts of the program compute the message ?
- ▶ Do these parts contain GPS data ?
 - ▶ If yes: GPS data influence message (data leak)
 - ▶ If no: message is independent of GPS data
- ▶ Program Dependence Graph
 - ▶ Nodes are statements and conditions of a program
 - ▶ Links are either
 - ▶ Control dependences (similar to CFG)
 - ▶ Data flow dependences
(connecting assignment with usage of variables)

Example




```

sum := 0;
i := 1;
while i <= 10 {
  sum := sum + i;
  i := i + 1
}
  
```

Backward Slice

- ▶ Let G be a program dependency graph and S be subset of nodes in G
- ▶ Let $n \Rightarrow m := n \xrightarrow{m} \vee n \xrightarrow{m}$
- ▶ Then, the backward slice $BS(G, S)$ is a graph G' with
 - ▶ $N(G') = \{n \mid n \in N(G) \wedge \exists m \in S. n \Rightarrow^* m\}$
 - ▶ $E(G') = \{n \xrightarrow{m} m \mid n \xrightarrow{m} m \in E(G) \wedge n, m \in N(G')\} \cup \{n \xrightarrow{m} m \mid n \xrightarrow{m} m \in E(G) \wedge n, m \in N(G')\}$
- ▶ Backward slice $BS(G, S)$ computes same values for variables occurring in S as G itself

Example



```

sum := 0;
i := 1;
while i <= 10 {
  sum := sum + i;
  i := i + 1
}
  
```

Summary

- ▶ Static Program Analysis is the analysis of run-time behavior of programs without executing them (sometimes called static testing)
- ▶ Approximations of program behaviors by analyzing the program's CFG
- ▶ Analysis include
 - ▶ available expressions analysis
 - ▶ reaching definitions
 - ▶ live variables analysis
 - ▶ program slicing
- ▶ These are instances of a more general framework
- ▶ These techniques are used commercially, e.g.
 - ▶ AbsInt aiT (WCET)
 - ▶ Astrée Static Analyzer (C program safety)